Journal of Dispute Resolution
Volume 2001

Issue 1

Article 10

2001

Mandatory Arbitration of an Employee's Statutory Rights: Still a
Controversial Issue or Are We Beating the Proverbial Dead Horse Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouse, Inc.
Andrea L. Myers

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrea L. Myers, Mandatory Arbitration of an Employee's Statutory Rights: Still a Controversial Issue or
Are We Beating the Proverbial Dead Horse - Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouse, Inc., 2001 J. Disp. Resol.
(2001)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized editor
of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Myers: Myers: Mandatory Arbitration of an Employee's Statutory Rights

Mandatory Arbitration of an
Employee's Statutory Rights: Still a
Controversial Issue or are We
Beating the Proverbial Dead Horse?
Penn v. Ryan's Family Steakhouse, Inc.'

I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1980s, the Supreme Court has espoused a strong preference for
arbitration in the employment setting. Despite this general preference, the Supreme
Court has never clearly stated that mandatory arbitration of statutory rights is always
reasonable. This omission has led to much controversy about whether this
preference permits the mandatory arbitration of all statutory rights or only those that
are amenable to arbitration as defined by the Supreme Court.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Craig Penn applied for a position at Ryan's Family Steakhouse, Inc. ("Ryan's")
in Fort Wayne, Indiana. 2 As part of the application process, Ryan's submitted to
Penn a form entitled "Job Applicant Agreement to Arbitration of Employment
Related Disputes" ("Agreement"). 3 Penn's hiring was conditioned upon his signing
the Agreement.4 Penn signed the Agreement and was ultimately hired by Ryan's.'
Two years later, Penn filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, alleging discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA"). 6 The issue to be resolved by the United States District
Court, Northern District of Indiana was whether a binding arbitration agreement

I. 95 F. Supp. 2d 940 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
2. Id. at 941.
3. Id. The agreement was between the employee and Employment Dispute Services, Inc. ("EDS"),
which had a contract with Ryan's. The agreement stated, in pertinent part:
Your potential Employer ("signatory company" or "Company") has entered into an
agreement with Employment Dispute Services, Inc. to arbitrate and resolve any and all
employment-related disputes between the Company's employees (and job applicants) and
the Company.... The decision of an EDS arbitrator is binding on all parties. There is no
appeal by any party on the merits of the dispute either to State or Federal court.
Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. At no time did Penn enter into an employment contract with Ryan's. Id.
6. Id. at 941.
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existed between Penn and Ryan's, and if so, did it compel Penn to submit his ADA
claim to arbitration.'
Penn had three arguments as to the unfitness of Employment Dispute Services,
Inc. ("EDS") as the arbitrator.8 First, Penn argued that the procedures EDS used to
select arbitrators "allowed for potential abuse and biased decision makers. "9 Second,
Penn argued that the Agreement should be void because it failed to state an exact
location for the arbitration hearing or whether it would take place in a location
convenient to Penn.' ° This omission meant that EDS controlled the location of the
proceeding and this could possibly place an undue burden on any plaintiff." Third,
Penn argued that the EDS rules provide for insufficient discovery.'
Ryan's responded by arguing that the EDS system was capable of providing a
fair and neutral arbitration panel because there are various safeguards built into the
selection process that will protect the plaintiff. 3 Ryan's next argued that EDS'
control of the location of the hearing did not burden the plaintiff because the location
was to be in the city or county where the employee worked.' 4 Lastly, Ryan's argued
that the discovery provision of the Agreement was proper. 5
The District Court of Indiana held that the EDS system of arbitration could not
produce a fit arbitration panel.' 6 Further, the court also held that even if the
Agreement provided for a fair and unbiased arbitration proceeding, it would not be
binding on Penn because 7he did not make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
right to a judicial forum.'

7. Id. at 943. The court first had to determine that ADA claims were arbitrable. Here the court
established that the Seventh Circuit impliedly allowed ADA claims to be arbitrated in Gibson v.
Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997). Further, the court cited the ADA
statute itself as allowing arbitration; "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use
of alternative means of dispute resolution, including.., arbitration, is encouraged." Id. See Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 12212 (1994).
8. Penn, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 944.
9. Id. at 945.
10. Id. at 948.
11. Id.
12. Id. Penn stated that he needed depositions from at least three to four individuals because his
allegations involved a customer, a coworker and two managers; however, Article XII of the Agreement
stated that each party may only schedule a deposition of one individual. Either party had the ability to
request further depositions, but they were discouraged and were to be granted in "extraordinary fact
situations only and for good cause shown." Id.
13. Id. at 947. Ryan's refers to the fact that the panel includes three neutral adjudicators. The first
adjudicator is a respected attorney. The second adjudicator is an employee who is a signatory to the EDS
Agreement, but not employed by Ryan's and is in no way involved in the dispute. The third adjudicator
is a manager who also is a signatory to the Agreement, but again not employed by Ryan's and not
involved in the dispute. Id.
14. Id. at 948. This argument was based on an affidavit of a manager at Ryan's but was not found
anywhere in the actual Agreement. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 943.
17. Id. at 943, 953-55.
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111. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since its passage in 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") has undergone
many changes."5 The main thrust of change has come from the United States
Supreme Court and its varying opinions about how broad the FAA should be and its
policies on arbitration in general. When Congress first passed the FAA in 1925 the
original purpose was to compel federal courts to recognize and accept agreements
to arbitrate that were entered into by parties of equal bargaining power.' 9 Since that
time, the Supreme Court has gradually strayed from the original purpose of the FAA
in an attempt to further advance the pro-arbitration sentiment and lighten the burden
on the court system. °
The first line of cases dealing with the scope of the FAA strongly supported the
original purpose of the FAA. These cases interpreted the FAA as allowing
agreements to arbitrate so long as the parties' individual rights were protected;
however, these cases also held that the FAA only applied to federal courts.2 Wilko
v. Swan was the first such case to address the scope of the FAA. 22 The Supreme
Court's decision in Wilko furthered the general skepticism toward arbitration at that
time by ruling that the arbitration forum would not provide adequate resolution of
statutory rights and that a person could not waive their right to a judicial forum for
a statutory claim.23
In the 1960s, the Court moved away from considering only individual consent
in determining the validity of arbitration agreements and began to focus on other
policy issues.24 During this time, social policies were used to narrow further the
scope of the FAA, beginning with the Supreme Court case ofAlexander v. GardnerDenver Co. 5
In Alexander, the Court was required to "determine whether the arbitration of
individual employees' statutory claims looked more like labor grievance arbitration

18. The FAA provides, in pertinent part:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof... shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
19. Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or CorporateTool?: Debunking the Supreme Court 's Preferencefor
Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
20. Id. at 642.
21. Id. at 641. See Stemlight, supra note 19, at 650-51. See also Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus,
284 U.S. 601 (1932). The Court in Marine implied that the FAA was a procedural statute applicable
only in federal courts. This reference was to the decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), which held that federal courts should apply federal procedural law, but state substantive law,
when deciding a diversity case. The implication of this decision was that the FAA would be applicable
only in federal courts if procedural, but if substantive, it would be allowed in state and federal courts.
Thus a federal court, if the FAA was substantive, would have to apply state law in determining the
validity of an arbitration agreement.
22. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
23. Id.
24. Stemlight, supra note 19, at 653.
25. 415 U.S. 36(1974).
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like individual or commercial arbitration." 26 The Court found that when a
statutory claim was involved it was more like an individual arbitration setting and
a union had no power to waive individual employees' statutory rights.27 The Court
then went on to determine whether a broader social policy existed that would require
an employee to arbitrate their individual statutory claims.2" The Court found that no
such policy existed. Because an individual with a statutory claim "not only redresses
his own injury, but also vindicates the important congressional policy against
discriminatory employment practices," he could not be required to waive his right
to a judicial forum by way of an arbitration agreement.29
During this era, however, the Court began to change its view somewhat about
the arbitration setting. In PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood& Conklin Manufacturing,the
Supreme Court changed its mind about the arbitration forum's inferiority to the
judicial forum.3" The Court found that there were certain instances in which the
arbitration forum could provide adequate resolution to a statutory claim.3
The present disposition of the Court began in 1983 with the Supreme Court case
of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co.32 In Moses, the
Court stated that § 2 of the FAA was a "congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements."33 The Court further stated that any
questions concerning the arbitrability or scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration." Solidifying this pro-arbitration sentiment was Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 3 In that case the Supreme Court
firmly stated that there was nothing in the FAA that created a presumption against
arbitration of statutory claims. 6 Further, the Court held that because of this strong
preference for arbitration, an agreement to arbitrate will be enforced absent any
showing that would render a normal contract invalid.37
...or

26. Id. at 51. See generally Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), which
states:
The courts have long favored arbitration in the collective bargaining situation because it
is seen as a substitute for "industrial strife." In the collective bargaining agreement the
rights and duties of the parties are stated. Further, arbitration in the collective bargaining
situation is seen as a "means of solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private
law ... in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and desires of the
parties." Contrast this to the individual employee context where arbitration works as a

substitution not for industrial strife, but for litigation.
Id. at 1473-76.
27. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51.
28. Id. at 55.
29. Id. at 44.
30. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).

31. Id. at 404.
32. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).

33. Id. at 24.
34. Id.
35. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).

36. Id. at 625.
37. Id. at 628. The Court also rejected the idea that the arbitral forum provides an insufficient means
for deciding statutory claims, stating:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute ....It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. We must assume
that if Congress intended ... to include protection against waiver of the right to ajudicial
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Finally, in 1991 the Supreme Court revisited the Alexander issue-whether an
individual could be required to arbitrate a statutory claim-in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.3" In Gilmer, the Court significantly narrowed
Alexander by holding that an individual may contract to arbitrate any employment
dispute and thereby waive their statutory rights (even in a collective bargaining
situation), unless the statute in question prohibited such a waiver.39
In light of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, courts must now use a
two-pronged analysis when making a decision about whether to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate a statutory right.40 First, the court must study the statute in
question to see if Congress intended to "preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue., 41 If such an intent exists, it should be ascertainable
from the text of the statute, its legislative history, or in any conflicts between the
purpose of the statute and arbitration. 2 Second, the court must study the agreement
between the parties to determine if it included the "statutory issues" in question. 3

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Penn, the district court had to decide whether the Agreement between Ryan's
and Penn was valid and enforceable thus requiring them to dismiss Penn's action and
compel arbitration.44
Following the Supreme Court's mandate for determining whether an arbitration
agreement is enforceable, the district court first had to decide if ADA claims were
arbitrable. 45 The court cited Bercovitch v. Baldwin School, Inc. 46 and Miller v.
PublicStorageManagement,Inc.47as authority for the proposition that ADA claims

were arbitrable.4 The Court also referred to the fact that the Seventh Circuit had
impliedly approved of the arbitration of ADA claims in Gibson v. Neighborhood
Health Clinics, Inc. 49 by ignoring the threshold question of whether ADA claims

forum, that intention will be deducible from the text or legislative history.
Id.
38. 500 U.S. 20 (1991 ). It is important to note that the Court did not decide the issue of whether the
FAA excludes all employment contracts or just those involving actual interstate commerce. There has
been much controversy over this issue; however, the majority of the courts dealing with this issue have
construed the FAA narrowly to exclude only contracts involving interstate commerce. There has been
much criticism of the Court's avoidance of this issue. Id. at 24-25 (Stephens, J.,
dissenting). See also
9 U.S.C. § 1.
39. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (allowing arbitration of ADEA claims). See also Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad
Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756,760 (9th Cir. 1997) (extending Gilmer to allow arbitration of ADA claims);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit
waiver of its statutory remedies).
40. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
41. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. See also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
42. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627.
43. Id. at 628.
44. Penn, 95 F.Supp. 2d at 940.
45. Id. at 942.
46. 133 F.3d 141, 150 (1st Cir. 1998).
47. 121 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1997).
48. Penn, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
49. 121 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997).
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were arbitrable and only analyzing the validity of the agreementi ° Finally, the court
looked at the text of the ADA as being arbitration friendly." However, the court did
not make a thorough analysis of the complete text of the ADA or its history or
purpose.2
Recognizing the unfitness of an arbitrator as grounds for invalidating an
arbitration agreement, the court evaluated the Agreement to determine if it was
capable of providing a fair forum to decide Penn's statutory claim under the ADA."
The court found that EDS' system of arbitration could not produce a fit arbitration
panel. 4 The court noted that although on its face the rules governing the arbitration
55
panel seemed fair, upon closer inspection they revealed a bias in favor of Ryan's.
Given the relationship between EDS and Ryan's (Ryan's, unlike Penn, was a repeat
customer of EDS who provided a lot of potential business), it was unlikely that Penn
would get a fair hearing. 6 The court stated specifically, that the Ryan's-EDS
relationship provided incentive for EDS to load the three lists from whom the three
arbitrators
were chosen with names of arbitrators that have sided with Ryan's in the
57
past.

The court agreed with Penn's second argument that the Agreement did not state
that the proceedings would take place in a neutral location convenient to the
plaintiff.5" Given that the panel procedures were already found unfit, the court cited
this as further proof of the invalidity of the agreement.59
Lastly, the court agreed with Penn's assertion that under the agreement the
parties had almost no discovery available to them.' Although agreeing with Ryan's
argument that limited discovery was allowed in the arbitration setting, in this case
the availability of more discovery was dependent upon the "good graces of an
6
arbitration panel stacked against the employee in the first place.", 1
The court also discussed a second reason for invalidating the Agreement, one
not advanced by the parties; Penn's waiver of his right to a judicial forum was not
knowing and voluntary. 62 Although the court found that no case in the Seventh
Circuit had directly required that an individual had to make a knowing and voluntary
waiver for a pre-dispute arbitration agreement to be valid, it decided to follow the

50. Penn, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 942-43.
51. Id. at 943. See also ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12212, which states: "Where appropriate and to the extent
authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, . . . including arbitration, is
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter."
52. Penn, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
53. Id. at 944-45.
54. Id. at 943.
55. Id. at 947.
56. Id. at 946-47.
57. Id.
58. Id.at 948. The court also stated that the EDS rules gave them control over the time, date, and
place for the hearing, thus enabling them to choose a forum inconvenient to Penn or any potential
plaintiff.
59. Penn, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 948.
60. Id. See supra note 12.
61. Penn, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 948. See Gihner, 500 U.S. at 31 (stating that limited discovery was
appropriate in the arbitration setting).
62. Penn, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 949.
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reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in requiring this type of waiver.63 The court cited
Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., which found that the differences in
remedies and procedural protections available in an arbitrable forum from that of a
judicial forum meant that a plaintiff may only be forced to forgo her statutory
remedies if she has knowingly agreed to do so.6
Using this logic, the court referred to the fact that the EDS rules and procedures
were never explained to Penn and that it was unlikely to be understood by the typical
65
job applicant at Ryan's as reasons for finding that Penn's waiver was not knowing.
The court also found the burden placed on Penn (or any applicant) to question the
arbitration process and its intricacies, was too high given the fact that he was trying
to get a job from Ryan's and was unlikely to question the process so as not to make
a bad impression. 66 Given that the Agreement provided for an unfair and biased
arbitration panel and the fact that Penn never knowingly waived his statutory rights,
the court determined that the Agreement was invalid and denied Ryan's motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration.67

V. COMMENT
The court in Penn clearly followed the majority position by using the
two-pronged analysis created in Mitsubishi and Gilmer. However, the court's
application of this analysis to Penn's case was inadequate in respect to the first
prong-whether ADA claims were arbitrable.
It is clear under the Gilmer test that courts determining the validity of an
agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim would have to interpret the statute in
question.6 8 The Supreme Court not only created this requirement, but also gave
instructions on how to effectively interpret the statute in order to determine if
Congress expressly precluded a waiver of the statute's judicial remedies.69 In order
to effectively determine Congress' intent, a court needs to study the text, the
legislative history of the statute, and its underlying purposes.70
The court in Penn did not truly analyze the text of the ADA. Its only reference
to the text was a citation to 42 U.S.C. § 12212 as evidence that the text of the ADA
was arbitration friendly because it encouraged the use of arbitration to resolve
disputes arising under the statute. 7 1 By its very terms, § 12212 does not provide for
mandatory arbitration of ADA claims. 72 The words "where appropriate" used at the
beginning of that section imply that use of alternative means of dispute resolution,

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 950-55,
Nelson, 119 F.3d at 762.
Penn, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 954-55.
Id.
Id. at 955.
Gihner, 500 U.S. at 26.

69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Penn, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
72 ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12212.
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such as arbitration, are not always appropriate." The text is not clear enough to
show that mandatory arbitration is always allowed, nor is it sufficient to show that
a waiver is precluded, something more is needed.
If the court in Penn had completed its analysis of the first prong of the test by
studying the legislative history, it would have discovered strong support for the
proposition that the judicial rights guaranteed under the ADA could not be waived.74
When Senate Bill 933 came to the House, the Alternative Dispute Resolution
("ADR") provision was added.75 The Judiciary committee adopted the ADR
provision (codified as § 12212) but limited its scope.76 The Judiciary committee
explicitly stated that "the use of alternative dispute mechanisms is intended to
supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by this Act.,," The committee also
clearly considered problems such as Penn's when they stated:
any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration . . . in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking
relief under the enforcement provisions of this Act . . . [and the
Committee] does not intend that the inclusion of [this section] be used to
preclude rights and
remedies that would otherwise be available to persons
78
with disabilities.
Because the House amended the original bill, it had to go to a conference committee
to resolve the differences.79 When considering the ADR provision, the conference
committee clearly adopted the reasoning of the Judiciary Committee:
It is the intent of the conferees that the use of.. . alternative dispute
resolution procedures is completely voluntary. Underno conditionwould
an arbitration clause in a[n] . . . employment contract prevent an
individualfrom pursuing their rights under the ADA. The conferees
adopt by reference the statement of the House Judiciary Report regarding
this provision. 0

73. Id. See also LaChance v. Northeast Publ'g, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 177, 187 n.20 (D. Mass. 1997).
74. The current version of the ADA began as Senate Bill 933. The House version, which significantly
amended the Senate version, was H.R. 2273. After a conference committee analyzed the two versions
and reconciled the differences, it was passed by both the Senate and the House to become the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-596, at 57 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 565-66.
75. Id. See also H.R. 2273 101st Cong. (1990).
76. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,499.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Committee also stated that the reasoning the Supreme Court used in Alexander, 415 U.S.
36, to preclude a waiver of Title VII rights also applied to the ADA.
79. See text supra note 74.
80. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-596, at 89 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 598 (emphasis
added).
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Clearly, Congress encouraged the use of ADR, but did not intend for it to prevent an
individual from using the judicial remedies available under the ADA."' Other cases
considering the arbitrability of ADA claims have held that Congress clearly
precludes a waiver of judicial remedies available in the ADA after studying the
legislative history. 2
Finally, the purpose of the ADA should have been studied by the court to see
if there are any conflicts between the purpose of the statute and arbitration of claims
arising under the statute. 3 The ADA states that one of the purposes of the statute
was to ensure that the federal government played a central role in the enforcement
of the ADA. 4 Seemingly, if the federal government is to be a key player in the
enforcement of the ADA, mandatory arbitration would conflict with this purpose. 5
the provisions
If mandatory arbitration is allowed, private parties are able to8enforce
6
government.
federal
the
of
guidance
the
without
ADA
of the
The Supreme Court in Gilmer stated that mandatory arbitration was not
appropriate for all statutory rights. 7 The Court also stated that if it was clear from
studying the text, legislative history and the underlying purpose of the statute that
Congress precluded a waiver of judicial remedies under the statute, mandatory
arbitration was not allowed. 8 In applying this analysis to the ADA, there are clear
indications in the text and the legislative history that Congress did intend to preclude
a waiver of the rights covered by the ADA.
Although it reached the right result, the court in Penn fell short of its duty in
regard to analyzing the arbitrability of the ADA. By stating that ADA claims were
arbitrable without actually applying the controlling Gilmer test, the court further
confused an already perplexing area of law. Further, the possibility that other courts
might use Penn as precedent is disturbing based upon the fact that the court used a
somewhat short-sighted analysis.
The court's citation to Bercovitch and Miller as proof that ADA claims are
subject to mandatory arbitration is also without much merit. In studying the analysis
used in both cases, it is apparent that they both made the same mistake as the court

81. See Wendy S. Tien, Compulsory Arbitration ofADA Claims: Disabling the Disabled, 77 MINN.
L. REV. 1443 (1993).
82. See LaChance, 965 F. Supp. at 186-87; Devlin v. Arizona Youth Soccer Ass'n, 1996 WL 118445
(D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 1996); Riley v. Weyerhaeuser Paper Co., 898 F. Supp. 324, 326 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
83. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
84. ADA 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). The statute provides:
It is the purpose of this chapter--(l) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities; (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role
in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with
disabilities; and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the
major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id.
85. See M. Lane Lowrey, Arbitration or Adjudication?: The Trials and Tribulations ofthe Federal
Circuit Split over Mandatory Arbitration ofEmployment Discrimination Claims, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 993
(1999).
86. Id. at 1009.
87. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
88. id.
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in Penn-they did not fully apply the Gilmer analysis, despite the fact that both held
Gihner to be controlling.8 9
For example, the court in Bercovitch held that the legislative history should only
be studied if the language was ambiguous. 90 The court found that the language of
§ 12212 was unambiguous and that it clearly supported the use of arbitration of ADA
claims, therefore no study of the history was necessary. 9' The fact that the court did
not even consider the meaning of the limitation "where appropriate" is strong
evidence that they may not have fully considered the issue. 92
Further, although it found it unnecessary, the court did examine the legislative
history. After studying the committee reports, the court ruled that in light of the
"clear" language of the text, the reports were not enough to overrule the text. 9
Whether the language of the ADA is clear is a tenuous argument at best, given the
"where appropriate" language. It seems obvious that the impreciseness of this phrase
leaves open the possibility that there are situations where arbitration is not
appropriate.94 Because it is at least possible that the language is ambiguous, the court
should have looked at the legislative history of the ADA to clarify any doubts. The
court, however, clearly ignored the plain language of the reports which patently
states that nothing in the ADR provision will work as a waiver of an individual's
statutory rights.95
Although the current test adopted by the Supreme Court, if applied correctly,
would have precluded a waiver of the judicial forum under the ADA in this case, this
is not true for every statute protecting individual rights. Many people involved in
employment arbitration feel that the Court's preference for binding arbitration in the
employment setting is not supported by any legitimate policy arguments. 96 The
major policy arguments in favor of arbitration are freedom of contract and that
arbitration is beneficial to society. 97
The Court used the freedom of contract rationale on several occasions to uphold
arbitration agreements in the employment setting. 98 Emphasis was placed on one's
right to enter into a private agreement and have it enforced according to its
bargained-for terms. However, in many of these cases the Court was studying an
arbitration agreement between two sophisticated corporations. It is true that such
contracts should be enforced as written because the parties presumably were
knowledgeable about the deal and what it entailed; however, this is not the case
when dealing with the type of agreement Penn entered into. As in Penn's case, many
of these employment contracts are contracts of adhesion where the parties have

89. See Bercovitch, 133 F.3d at 150; Miller, 121 F.3d at 218.
90. Bercovitch, 133 F.3d at 149. A similar line of reasoning is used in Miller, but only Bercovitch
will be analyzed because its analysis is more in-depth than Miller.
91. Id. at 149-50.
92. It has been argued that the motivation to clear the court dockets may have caused some judges
to support the mandatory arbitration of statutory claims, even if Congress did not intend to allow this.
Stemlight, supra note 19, at 639-42; Lowrey, supra note 85, at 1005-06.
93. Bercovitch, 133 F.3d at 150.
94. See supra notes 72-73.
95. See supra note 75.
96. See Stemlight, supra note 19, at 674.
97. See Stemlight. supra note 19, at 674.
98. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 630.
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unequal bargaining power and the employee is forced to accept the agreement or lose
the job. 90 By promoting a policy favoring binding arbitration, the Court is leaving
these individuals without recourse.
The other reason used for validating binding arbitration is that it is beneficial to
society. The rationale usually entails a discussion of how arbitration is less costly
and more efficient and how it offers an atmosphere less combative than a courtroom,
thus encouraging amicable resolutions to employment conflicts.'0 0 However, a close
inspection of the arbitration process reveals that these statements are often not true.
In an arbitration hearing, the arbitrator is not required to write opinions nor do
the opinions have any obligatory precedential value, making it impossible to form
a cohesive body of law or create guidelines for future hearings.' 0 ' Also, arbitrators
are allowed to consider statutory law; however, the courts are not allowed to reverse
if the application of such law is incorrect.'0 2 Further, it is not clear that arbitration
is faster or cheaper than litigation in many instances due to the increased complexity
many cases heard by an arbitrator
of issues in the arbitration setting and the fact that
03
would have been settled before going to trial.1
Even if arbitration was clearly faster than litigation, it is precisely this attribute
which makes arbitration inferior to judicial resolution when dealing with statutory
rights. The ADA, like other civil rights statutes, implicates "the public's interest in
its judicial enforcement."'04 These statutes were enacted to eradicate years of
discrimination and to create more equality in the opportunities offered to those
individuals who were being discriminated against. The means for enforcing such
rights "must not rest with the arbitral process because... [they] involve questions
of law, not of contract interpretation. ' °'

VI. CONCLUSION
Given the apparent conflict between Congress' intent and the courts'
interpretation, the controversy over whether an employee's statutory rights can be
subjected to mandatory arbitration will likely continue until Congress decides to act.
It seems that the only way to finally resolve this issue is for Congress to clearly state
that when dealing with a statutory right, arbitration is only appropriate after a dispute
arises and when the parties voluntarily agree to arbitrate. It would also be wise to
give explicit advice on how to deal with interpretation problems of such a provision
so that there will be no room for doubt and no possibility for a court to read in any
exceptions that would compromise an individual's statutory rights.
ANDREA L. MYERS

99. See Sternight. supra note 19, at 675-77. See also Tien, supra note 81, at 1463.
100. Sternlight, supra note 19, at 693-97; Tien, supra note 81, at 1467-68.
101. Tien, supra note 81, at 1467-68.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Tien, supra note 8],at 1467-68.
Sternlight, supra note 19, at 694-95.
Tien, supra note 81, at 1470-71.
Tien, supra note 81, at 1471.
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